HAARETZ: NETANYAHU CALLS HIMSELF CHURCHILL – HISTORY MAY RECALL HIM AS MILOSEVIC
Israel’s prime minister and his fans love to compare his wartime leadership and oratorical skills to Churchill’s. But from allying with violent nationalists and suppressing ‘unpatriotic’ media outlets to ICC arrest warrants for war crimes, Netanyahu’s trajectory resembles far more that of Slobodan Milošević
By: Etan Nechin
Photo: Haaretz
In July, while Israel was engulfed in protests after yet another foiled Gaza cease-fire and hostage deal, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was on his way to address the U.S. Congress.
The visit was presented not only as a show of strength for Netanyahu but also framed in historic terms. Pundits celebrated his achievement of breaking Winston Churchill’s record for the most invitations to address Congress. During the address, his fourth, Netanyahu quoted Churchill: “Give us the tools, and we will finish the job.”
This isn’t by accident. Netanyahu, the son of a historian, has always been deeply preoccupied with his legacy and self-image. He has often drawn comparisons between himself and Churchill: as a wartime prime minister, author, masterful orator, and a bulwark against fascism. Even after finishing his speech in Congress, Netanyahu stopped by Churchill’s bust to take a photo, to make sure the comparison was lost on no one.
His fans in the media like to boost the analogy. Just last week, right-wing radio host Naveh Dromi delivered a four-minute monologue comparing Netanyahu to Churchill, claiming, “Churchill defeated the Nazis with U.S. support; Netanyahu eliminated the Iranian axis despite the U.S.”
However, after a year of war, death, and displacement, and with an arrest warrant for him issued by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for war crimes and crimes against humanity, Netanyahu’s trajectory aligns less with Churchill and more with that of Serb leader Slobodan Milošević.
As with Netanyahu, in his early years, Milošević was not regarded as an extremist. He started as an unremarkable communist functionary. But like Netanyahu, he cynically enabled and empowered ultra-nationalist movements in Serbia, exploiting their extremism for his own purposes. The pact he forged, believing he could command their allegiance, unraveled as these uncontrollable forces broke free from his grasp, ultimately plunging his nation into the abyss.
Both Netanyahu and Milošević walked away from their post-WWII states’ founding ethos: in the case of Israel, mamlachtiut, governance for the sake of the entire nation rather than special interest groups; in the case of Yugoslavia, “brotherhood and unity.” They recognized the power that could be unleashed by exploiting societal tensions to divide and conquer, pitting groups against one another.
Milošević initially distanced himself from Serb extremists, even publicly condemning their actions. In 1995, he told UK Ambassador Sir Ivor Roberts, “It has nothing to do with me. I told these madmen that this crazy way to behave brings the Serbian people into disrepute.”
Similarly, Netanyahu once vowed never to align with far-right provocateur Itamar Ben-Gvir or the hard-right settler movement, dismissing and condemning their extremist views. Former President Reuven Rivlin recounted Netanyahu’s declaration: “Not only will I not bring into the government people who are followers of Kahane, but I will also not be photographed with them or associate with them.”
Netanyahu publicly declared that Ben-Gvir would not serve as a minister in his government and even refused to share a stage with him during a campaign stop.
When their political fortunes turned, their stance changed, and forming an alliance with violent nationalists became their only way to retain power. Netanyahu defended his decision to appoint Ben-Gvir as internal security minister by telling NPR, “He’s modified a lot of his views,” downplaying the move by adding, “They are joining me. I’m not joining them.”
Following the Dayton Peace Accords, Slobodan Milošević initially gained some favor in the West but faced increasing domestic challenges. His party suffered significant losses in elections marred by irregularities. In response, he unleashed forces that ultimately committed atrocities in Kosovo – events that ultimately provoked NATO intervention and bombing.
For Netanyahu, once his legal woes came to large, he turned to the hard-right, midwifing their entry into mainstream politics as part of a potential governing coalition, and was eventually seen smiling in a campaign photo with Ben-Gvir.
Both also skillfully deflected blame from their administrations, redirecting it toward targets such as the media, dissidents, legislators, outside agitators and Muslims.
After his unexpected victory following Rabin’s assassination, Netanyahu immediately shifted from head of state to a self-styled defender of Jewish identity. His infamous hot mic remark to a powerbroker rabbi – “The left forgot what it means to be Jewish” – made it clear he did not see the millions who supported Oslo to the millions protesting in the streets, let alone Israeli Arabs, as part of his constituency. For him, it’s not just Israel versus Hamas, but his supporters versus mainstream liberal society.
Whether Netanyahu’s nationalism, like Milošević’s stems from heartfelt conviction or craven opportunism, his genuine disdain for Palestinians and Arabs is evident. Like Milošević, he perceives himself as a leader at the forefront of a war against Islam, positioning himself as a defender of “the West.” Like Netanyahu, Milošević justified his actions as defending Europe from Muslim “hordes.”
Not unlike Milošević, Netanyahu has mastered the art of manipulating reality for his supporters, transforming defeats into perceived victories. Despite the wars he has lost, he has managed to survive politically by reframing failures as triumphs.
ust as Milošević spun the loss of Kosovo into a victory over the West – highlighting that Kosovo technically remained part of Yugoslavia in 1999 while de facto losing control – Netanyahu has employed similar tactics. He has emphasized actions like the assassinations of Sinwar and Nasrallah, bombing operations in Iran, and other military actions to overwrite the catastrophe of October 7 and the subsequent year of bombardments and displacement and Israel becoming a pariah state.
During Milošević’s reign, the Serbian public was fed a steady stream of media narratives about military successes and the supposed threat posed by Muslims. Any criticism of the war or acknowledgment of atrocities in was silenced under strict laws, dismissed as unpatriotic, demoralizing, or treasonous. The few media outlets who dared to criticize him were closed, and even editors targeted.
Netanyahu’s push to reshape Israeli media, along with his attacks on journalists and critical outlets, reflects a belief – much like Milošević’s – that controlling the narrative is essential to maintaining power, even if it means destroying the free press to silence dissenting voices and credible scrutiny.
As much as both leaders cultivated brutal nationalism, their regimes were/are also marked by nepotism and corruption. Slobodan’s wife, Mira Marcovic – sociologist, functionary, and self-professed clairvoyant – was seen as driving a force behind their hardline policies and resistance to concessions, like Sara Netanyahu today.
Likewise, their sons, Yair and Marko, were criticized as privileged ne’er-do-wells, embodying controversy and detachment while benefiting from their fathers’ power. Marko lived a lavish lifestyle, avoided military service, and opened Bambiland, a Serbian amusement park during the NATO bombing, where he would parade around in uniform. It’s hard not to draw parallels with Yair Netanyahu gallivanting in Miami, inciting against the military, and aligning himself with far-right American reactionaries, rather than even living in Israel.
But perhaps the most important lesson is that an arrest warrant by the ICC isn’t a magic pill that will bring down populist demagogues. Milošević’s downfall didn’t come as a direct result of the arrest warrant issued in 1999 but was driven by the Serbian people’s resilience and a united opposition that emerged after years of hardship and protests.
Cornered strongmen are dangerous. As protests grew, Milošević became paranoid and blamed the generals for concessions and defeats. As Misha Glenny wrote back in 1998 in the London Review of Books, “Milošević’s growing suspicion of the Army has led him to rely instead on his personal retinue – the vastly expanded police force comprising 60-70,000 well-armed and well-paid men.”
Netanyahu didn’t need to pay for police control. Instead, he appointed Ben-Gvir, a former Shin Bet target, to oversee them. Under Ben-Gvir’s authority, the police have become an arm of the government, a de facto militia aligned with the far right, beating up hostage families, arresting antiwar protesters, fortifying Netanyahu’s residence, and distributing guns through the ministry without proper oversight.
After the ICC issued arrest warrants against him, Milošević proclaimed, “I don’t recognize the tribunal. It’s a political mechanism designed to annihilate the Serb people.”
Similarly, Netanyahu has fused his personal identity with that of Israel, framing criticism of his actions as an attack on the nation itself, and the Jewish people. “The antisemitic decision of the International Court in The Hague is nothing short of a modern-day Dreyfus trial. Israel rejects the legitimacy of this decision,” said the prime minister in a video address. Netanyahu, in a single breath, transforms from Churchillian defiance to the helpless cry of a persecuted victim.
Even after the arrest warrant, Milošević clung to power and ran for reelection. However, youth-led resistance gained momentum, and the opposition’s eventual unity around a single candidate triggered Milošević’s attempts to sabotage elections, prompting nationwide outrage.
Thousands gathered in Belgrade, enduring police resistance until the armed forces began to defect. A general strike, supported by key unions and emboldened by defectors like Belgrade’s mayor, led to the Bulldozer Revolution. Faced with defeat, Milošević finally conceded, though he focused on a minor grievance: his son Marko’s house was ransacked.
After Milošević’s defeat, Marko fled to Russia with his mother, Mira, who later remarked, “Nothing mattered anymore.” This echoes Sara Netanyahu’s alleged comment after Benjamin Netanyahu’s 1999 loss: “Why should we try? Let’s leave and let the country burn.”
Even after Milošević’s defeat, the new leader, Vojislav Koštunica, hesitated to hand Milošević over to The Hague, citing concerns that the tribunal appeared “selective in choosing cases that serve its notion of justice.”
It was corruption, specifically, the revelation of Milošević defrauding the state treasury of $300 million, that became the tipping point for his arrest. A parallel emerges in Benjamin Netanyahu’s criminal trial, where charges of bribery, fraud, and breach of trust similarly cast a shadow over his leadership. Both cases illustrate the dangerous intersection between the drive for political survival and a willingness to jeopardize the country’s population and dismantle its institutions in a desperate bid to retain power.
When he eventually lost power and was sent to The Hague, many Serbs were shocked. They believed his downfall stemmed from economic struggles and international sanctions rather than the war crimes he orchestrated.
Similarly, under Netanyahu’s leadership, Israeli politicians have framed the suffering in Gaza as a necessary price for national security, portraying the blockade, military strikes, and humanitarian crises as inevitable. Criticism is often dismissed as anti-Israel, demoralizing, or driven by hidden political agendas.
Much like in Serbia, this narrative shields the public from grappling with the culture of denial and indifference propagated not only by the government but mainstream politicians more broadly.
Some argue the ICC warrants are meaningless because they can’t be enforced, but the idea that Netanyahu might be arrested in London misses the point entirely. This has always been about Israeli society. As in Serbia and elsewhere, it’s up to the people to drive him out of power, not external courts. The Serbs did so by voting him out. The ICC should provide the moral and political momentum for that to happen in Israel, too. The warrant is a reminder that supporting Israel does not equate to supporting Netanyahu; in fact, it demands opposing him.
